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Risk and Lack of Diversiﬁ  cation 
under Employee Ownership 
and Shared Capitalism
Joseph R. Blasi, Douglas L. Kruse, and 
Harry M. Markowitz
I am in favor of having as large a unit as market conditions 
will allow. . . . To suppose that safety-  ﬁ  rst consists in having a 
small gamble in a large number of diﬀerent [companies] where 
I have no information to reach a good judgment, as compared 
with a substantial stake in a company where one’s information 
is adequate, strikes me as a travesty of investment policy.
—John Maynard Keynes Letter to F. C. Scott on February 6, 
1942 (Keynes 1983). (Keynes managed the investments of a 
large British insurance company and the endowment funds of 
Kings College Cambridge [quoted in Bernstein (1992, 48)]).
The correlation among returns is not the same for all securities. 
We generally expect the returns on a security to be more corre-
lated with those in the same industry than those of unrelated 
industries. Business connections among corporations, the fact 
that they service the same area, a common dependence on mili-
tary expenditures, building activity, or the weather can increase 
the tendency of particular returns to move up and down to-
gether. To reduce risk it is necessary to avoid a portfolio whose 
securities are highly correlated with each other.
—Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection (1991, 5)
As we saw in chapter 1, a substantial proportion of private sector workers 
participate in some form of shared rewards and there is evidence that shared 
Joseph R. Blasi is a professor of human resource management and labor studies and employ-
ment relations at the Rutgers School of Management and Labor Relations, and a research 
associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Douglas L. Kruse is a professor 106    Joseph R. Blasi, Douglas L. Kruse, and Harry M. Markowitz
capitalism plays a positive role in economic performance (Kruse, Blasi, and 
Park 2008; Freeman Kruse, and Blasi 2008; Blasi et al. 2008; Harden, Kruse, 
and Blasi 2008). With this level of incidence and these potential outcomes, 
it is incumbent on scholars to ﬁ  gure out whether and under what conditions 
such practices make sense or are really ill-  advised. Since shared capitalism, 
especially in the form of employee stock ownership and stock options, is 
an investment, we need to examine it from the critical perspective of risk. 
This chapter considers two questions: what is the impact of subjective risk 
on workers’ attitudes, preferences, and behaviors under shared capitalism? 
Can employee ownership and other forms of worker equity participation 
be consistent with proper diversiﬁ  cation? While the possible jeopardy from 
employee stock ownership constitutes a major objection by economists, the 
impact of subjective risk under shared capitalism and the resolution of the 
empirical question “How much is too much?” in a portfolio has never been 
comprehensively addressed.
Many economists have seriously worried about the phenomenon of 
employee stock ownership because it possibly “puts all one’s eggs in one 
basket.” Workers risk losing both their job and their investments in the 
same ﬁ  rm. Looking at subjective worker behavior, Benartzi and Thaler’s 
incisive study (2001) found that workers put about 42 percent of their assets 
in the company stock account and then split the remaining assets fairly 
evenly between nonemployee ownership equities and ﬁ  xed income securities 
with the result that the workers in the companies with employee ownership 
are over 70 percent invested in equities, in eﬀect, further adding to lack of 
diversiﬁ  cation in their portfolios. Benartzi (2001) has shown that workers 
in large corporate deﬁ  ned contribution retirement plans (such as 401(k) 
plans) increase the proportion of their holdings in employee ownership of 
company stock after the company’s equity performs well on the market, 
allocating four times more new investments to company stock in the future 
when the company stock had done well in the past. He concludes that this 
violates a cardinal law of economics, portfolio diversiﬁ  cation. Meulbroek 
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School of Management and Labor Relations, and a research associate of the National Bureau 
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(2002) compares the risk of holding one company’s stock to a diversiﬁ  ed 
portfolio for all stocks listed in the Center For Research on Securities Prices 
(CRSP) and concludes that “on average 42% of the stock’s market value 
will be sacriﬁ  ced by failing to diversify” (29). She looked at expectations 
of what could happen rather than the speciﬁ  c tracking of actual data on 
employee investments in company stock and considered the extreme case 
of 100 percent employee investment in company stock. Meulbroek sees no 
rational basis for company stock ownership by employees whatsoever (2002, 
14) and makes a strong recommendation against any employee ownership 
at all in the economy.
3.1    Data  and  Methods
Our analysis uses the NBER data set (described in the “Studying Shared 
Capitalism” section of the Introduction). Within this data set 81.5 percent 
of the workers had one or more forms of shared capitalist rewards, and 
analyses are conducted on only these workers (35,429 employees). This data 
set is particularly useful to examine risk because it provides a comprehensive 
description of the possible ways a worker can share in the proﬁ  ts or equity 
of the company plus detailed information on their income and wealth, 
organization of work, speciﬁ  c measures of their attitudes toward shared 
capitalism, their preferences for more or less shared capitalism, and their 
behavioral responses to shared capitalism (loyalty, turnover, and willing-
ness to work harder for the company). These measures of worker attitudes, 
preferences, and behavioral responses are the main dependent variables of 
the study. Moreover, variables on empowerment and employee relations and 
work structure allow us to examine their role in the story. To deal with the 
nonrepresentative ﬁ  rm problem, we include company ﬁ  xed eﬀects in our 
calculations.
The economic insecurity score is the main independent variable of the 
study. The three components of a worker’s economic insecurity score are the 
size of each worker’s ﬁ  xed annual pay, how many multiples each worker’s 
total wealth (minus debt) is relative to that worker’s ﬁ  xed annual pay, and 
the extent to which each worker perceives they are competitively paid in the 
ﬁ  rm where they work. Brieﬂ  y put, the score expresses how much cushion 
each worker’s current capital oﬀers them relative to their annual income, 
taking into account whether the worker feels fairly compensated or not 
based on expectations from the local labor market. If a worker perceives 
he or she is underpaid, then proﬁ  t sharing or employee stock ownership 
may be perceived as wage substitution. The higher the score the more the 
worker’s economic insecurity and the more the worker’s capital is in danger. 
The construction of the economic insecurity score is explained in detail in 
the appendix.
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At one extreme, that of the high economic insecurity score, is a worker with 
ﬁ  xed annual pay of $25,000, whose total wealth (minus debt) is less than 
$25,000, and who perceives that she or he is being paid signiﬁ  cantly below 
market for their job position relative to comparable workers. We hold that 
the more insecure worker—just as Adam Smith predicts from his observa-
tions of the French sharecroppers in the Theoretical Perspectives section 
following—will be resistant to risking his or her own capital in the ﬁ  rm. 
At the other extreme, that of the low economic insecurity score (i.e., high 
economic security), is a worker with ﬁ  xed annual pay of $75,000, whose 
total wealth is four multiples of annual pay at $300,000, and who perceives 
that he or she is being paid signiﬁ  cantly above the market rate. We hold that 
this worker will be more comfortable with shared capitalism because their 
higher salary creates less immediate economic insecurity, their wealth cush-
ions a signiﬁ  cant amount of potential insecurity, and their perception that 
they receive a ﬁ  xed wage above the market, for them, does not frame their 
shared capitalism as wage substitution. Obviously, however, both workers 
are vulnerable to the same peril of job loss. Table 3.1 shows the economic 
insecurity scores for the sample. There is a lot of variation in the sample. 
Because some components of the score were not contained in all company 
surveys, the score is only available for 22,980 workers.
3.2    Theoretical  Perspectives
What we expect to ﬁ  nd about the impact of risk on the attitudes, prefer-
ences, and behavioral outcomes of workers in ﬁ  rms under shared capitalism 
has been inspired by the work of Adam Smith, which provides important 
background to this discussion. A key theme of Smith’s economics is that 
capitalism would result in better economic performance as a result of more 
eﬀort, productivity, and wealth. While he did not deal with portfolio diver-
Table 3.1  The economic insecurity score
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siﬁ  cation per se, Smith wrote about the evolution from feudalism to the new 
market system as part of a long line of economists who stressed that capital-
ism also involved greater risk and speculation. The principal advantage of 
feudalism for the worker was the protection it provided from such danger 
(see Smith [1776, Book III, 2.2–  2.21]). Adam Smith, however, deﬁ  nitely 
recognized that a worker could be interested in shared rewards, but that it 
was not a common arrangement at that time. He wrote:
It sometimes happens, indeed, that a single independent workman has 
stock suﬃcient both to purchase the materials of his work, and to main-
tain himself till it be completed. He is both master and workman, and 
enjoys the whole produce of his own labour, or the whole value which 
it adds to the materials upon which it is bestowed. It includes what are 
usually two distinct revenues, belonging to two distinct persons, the proﬁ  ts 
of stock, and the wages of labour. (Smith 1776, Book I. 8.9–  10)
Smith recognized the incentive value of such shared capitalist rewards 
and cited its role in improved economic performance. In writing about the 
French Metayers or sharecroppers as one example of a shared capitalist 
institution, he said:
The proprietor furnished them with the seed, cattle, and instruments of 
husbandry, the whole stock, in short, necessary for cultivating the farm. 
The produce was divided equally between the proprietor and the farmer, 
after setting aside what was judged necessary for keeping up the stock, 
which was restored to the proprietor when the farmer either quitted, or 
was turned out of the farm. Land occupied by such tenants is properly 
cultivated at the expense of the proprietor as much as that occupied by 
slaves. There is, however, one very essential diﬀerence between them. Such 
tenants, being freemen, are capable of acquiring property, and having a 
certain proportion of the produce of the land, they have a plain interest 
that the whole produce should be as great as possible, in order that their 
own proportion may be so. A slave, on the contrary, who can acquire 
nothing but his maintenance, consults his own ease by making the land 
produce as little as possible over and above that maintenance. (Smith 
1776, Book III, chapter 2, 11–  12) (as quoted in Laﬀont and Martimort 
[2002, 10])
However, Smith identiﬁ  ed a critical problem with the idea in addressing 
risk under such shared capitalist arrangements when he identiﬁ  ed the moral 
hazard problem of sharecropping: sharecroppers do not desire to risk their 
own capital. Thus he wrote:
It could never, however, be the interest even of this last species of cultiva-
tors to lay out, in the further improvement of the land, any part of the 
little stock which they might save from their own share of the produce, 
because the lord, who laid out nothing, was to get one-  half of whatever 
it produced. . . . It might be the interest of a metayer to make the land 110    Joseph R. Blasi, Douglas L. Kruse, and Harry M. Markowitz
produce as much as could be brought out of it by means of the stock 
furnished by the proprietor; but it could never be his interest to mix any 
part of his own with it. In France, where ﬁ  ve parts out of six of the whole 
kingdom are said to be still occupied by this species of cultivators, the pro-
prietors complain that their metayers take every opportunity of employ-
ing the master’s cattle rather in carriage than in cultivation; because in the 
one case they get the whole proﬁ  ts to themselves, in the other they share 
them with their landlord. (Smith 1776, Book III, chapter 2, 13)(as quoted 
in Laﬀont and Martimort [2002, 10])
While he did not envision how such shared capitalist incentives would 
be structured in a complex economy, Smith clearly saw the advantages of 
shared capitalism. This analysis suggests that the incentive eﬀect would be 
diminished if the worker’s own capital was subject to excessive risk. We 
expect that workers will be risk averse in mixing their own capital with that 
of the ﬁ  rm. Smith’s discussion is one of the inspirations for our economic 
insecurity variable.
While Smith’s notion is based on salient historical observations, Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s prospect theory (1979, 2000) inspired us to 
develop a unique way to explore the issues at hand. Prospect theory holds 
that people decide about outcomes based on a reference point (reﬂ  ecting 
their status quo) rather than based upon some “objective” ﬁ  nal situation or 
status. In their view, this status quo “frames” their decision. They note that 
diﬀerent attitudes toward risk will emerge when a person perceives gains 
relative to their reference point or losses relative to their reference point and 
that people will care more about potential losses than potential gains. The 
economic insecurity score provides one measure of a worker’s status quo and 
is directly inﬂ  uenced by Adam Smith’s observation that a worker will not 
want to risk his or her own capital in a shared capitalist arrangement.
3.3    Hypotheses
Reﬂ  ecting Adam Smith’s perspective that workers will not jeopardize their 
own capital, this part of the chapter explores subjective risk, namely, how 
workers in shared capitalist arrangements respond to variations in their 
economic insecurity. People are risk averse. Our ﬁ  rst hypothesis is:
HYPOTHESIS ONE: As the economic insecurity score increases, attitudes 
toward shared capitalism, preferences for variable pay, and workplace out-
comes (behaviors) under shared capitalism will worsen.
Next we examine the impact of company culture. A worker’s economic 
insecurity and response to shared capitalism are likely to be related to worker 
empowerment (inﬂ  uence over one’s job and the workplace) and perceived 
fairness. In the absence of empowerment, shared capitalism may easily be 
seen as nothing more than increased income exposure, whereas empower-Risk and Lack of Diversiﬁ  cation under Employee Ownership    1 1 1
ment creates a greater sense that one can aﬀect workplace performance and 
rewards under shared capitalism. Regarding fairness, a number of scholars 
have argued that economists should add to their analyses the “preferences 
that people have for being treated fairly” (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 
[1986a, 1986b, S285–  6]; see also Akerlof [1979] and Arrow [1973]). Good 
employee-  management relations, where employees feel they are treated 
fairly, may be an important condition to create cooperation and higher per-
formance under shared capitalism. Workers may therefore respond better 
to shared capitalism when they have greater empowerment and perceive 
better employee relations, diminishing the negative eﬀects of economic inse-
curity. This is consistent with the idea that under the right conditions, shared 
capitalism can strengthen the “psychological contract” between employees 
and the ﬁ  rm (Rousseau and Shperling 2003). The second hypothesis is:
HYPOTHESIS TWO: Lack of empowerment and poor employee relations help 
explain the negative relationship between the economic insecurity score and 
attitudes toward shared capitalism, preferences for variable pay, and behavioral 
outcomes under shared rewards.
Several researchers have linked a bundle of high performance work prac-
tices to either improved operating performance of individual facilities or bet-
ter productivity, lower turnover, and better total shareholder return of ﬁ  rms 
(Appelbaum et al. 2000; Becker, Huselid, and Ulrich 2001; Cappelli and 
Neumark 2001; Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi 1995). These bundles are 
characterized by a coordinated integration of the various “high performance 
people management” systems inside the ﬁ  rm and involve: selective recruit-
ment, intensive training and performance management, self-  directed work 
teams, employee involvement, and performance sharing.1 These bundles 
may interact with shared capitalism in the same way as previously hypothe-
sized for employee empowerment and employee relations: such practices can 
help create the means for employees to positively aﬀect performance, and 
strengthen the psychological contract between employees and the ﬁ  rm. This 
is likely to make employees more receptive to shared capitalism, and dimin-
ish the negative eﬀects of economic insecurity. Put simply, we hypothesize 
that a more engaging work system will buﬀer worker response to economic 
uncertainty and insecurity. The third hypothesis is:
HYPOTHESIS THREE: The presence of a high performance work system 
will reduce the negative eﬀect of high economic insecurity on attitudes toward 
shared capitalism, preferences for variable pay, and outcomes under shared 
rewards.
1. The authors are indebted to Mark Huselid for suggesting what themes and wording should 
be considered as critical for our questions regarding the measurement of alignment with the 
company’s strategy. While we did some editing to make the questions accessible to the wide 
variety of workers and ﬁ  rms in the study, they basically follow his ideas.112    Joseph R. Blasi, Douglas L. Kruse, and Harry M. Markowitz
3.4    Results
Risk aversion is the general norm for workers. Using the employee surveys 
of the NBER Shared Capitalism data set we can brieﬂ  y review ﬁ  ndings on 
the general preference for risk aversion or risk seeking among the workers 
in the sample based on demographic group and job characteristics. This is 
based on responses to the question:
Some people like to take risks and others dislike taking risks. Where would 
you place yourself on a scale of how much you like or dislike taking risks, 
where 0 is hating to take any kind of risk and 0 is loving to take risks?
Hate to take risks  Love to take risks
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
The sample tends toward risk seeking: the mean is 5.6, with only one- quarter 
(26 percent) giving an answer of 4 or below, while 55 percent gave an answer 
above 5. Those with low earnings are predictably more likely to say they 
are risk averse, with 53 percent giving scores of 5 or below, compared to 27 
percent of the high earners. The results are similar when breaking the ﬁ  gures 
down by wealth categories.
Another measure of risk aversion comes from the survey question:
You are oﬀered a bet. You have a 10 percent chance of winning $1,000. 
Would you take the bet if it cost you: (mark highest price you would pay)
    $150   $100   $50   $20   $10   $1 
   Would not pay anything
One-  third (33 percent) of the individuals indicated extreme risk aversion, 
saying they would pay nothing or only $1 for the bet, while at the other 
extreme, 7 percent would pay $100 and 2 percent would pay $150 (above 
the expected value of the bet, indicating extreme risk loving). This is also 
related to earnings: 41 percent of the low earners would pay no more than $1, 
compared to 19 percent of high earners. It is noteworthy, however, that there 
is a good deal of dispersion even within the low-  earning and high-  earning 
groups. With this perspective on the general risk aversion of workers, let us 
now examine the results.
HYPOTHESIS ONE: As the economic insecurity score increases, attitudes 
toward shared capitalism, preferences for variable pay, and workplace out-
comes (behaviors) under shared incentives will worsen.
The sample is workers who say that they participate in any kind of shared 
capitalist practice, including company stock ownership of any kind, stock 
options, proﬁ  t or gain sharing, or any combination of these. Table 3.2 shows 
the results and reports on a number of individual variables that measure 
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workplace outcomes (behaviors) under shared reward situations. Some of 
the dependent variables are also grouped into summative attitude, prefer-
ence, and outcome variables where a large sample size is amenable to such 
a grouping:
Summative attitudes variable—measures (a) how important it is to work 
in a company with employee ownership, and (b) how much the worker 
feels like an owner.
Summative preferences variable—measures (a) preference for variable pay 
(a 50/ 50 chance to make 10 percent more or 5 percent less over ﬁ  xed pay); 
and (b) the preference for next pay increase as all ﬁ  xed wages, a mixture 
of ﬁ  xed and performance-  based, or all performance-  based pay.
Summative outcomes (behaviors) variable—measures (a) whether the 
worker is looking hard for a job with another company in the next year 
(reverse scored); (b) the extent of their loyalty to their company; (c) 
whether they will work hard for the company; (d) whether they plan to 
stay with their company for a long time; and (e) whether they see their 
current job as part of a long-  term career.
We will review these ﬁ  ndings in some detail. The ﬁ  ndings show that as the 
economic insecurity score increases, workers with increased economic inse-
curity respond with more negative attitudes about company ownership (lines 
1 to 16), weaker preferences for additional shared incentives in their com-
pany (lines 17 to 28), and worse workplace outcomes (lines 29 to 39). A 
higher economic insecurity score is associated with very negative responses 
to shared capitalism just as Adam Smith’s views would suggest.
Looking more closely at the individual measures of attitudes, as the eco-
nomic insecurity score increases, workers report that it is less important to 
them to work for a company that provides stock ownership or stock options 
to its employees (line 2), that they feel less like owners (line 3), that ownership 
is less important to them (line 4), that stock options were less important in 
attracting them to work for the company (line 5), and that the Employee 
Stock Purchase Plan was less important in attracting them to work for the 
company (line 6). (Note that the score does not predict that workers in ESOP 
companies said ESOPs were less likely to have attracted them to work for 
the company on line 7. This is probably because ESOPs under most circum-
stances do not require workers to buy the stock with their own capital so 
ESOPS are less dangerous as long as they do not involve wage or beneﬁ  t con-
cessions, which are uncommon in most ESOPs.) As one would expect, as the 
economic insecurity score increases workers are more likely to say that a less 
speculative cash incentive (line 8), cash bonus (line 13), or ﬁ  xed wage increase 
(line 14) will increase their motivation to improve the business success of the 
company. As the economic insecurity score increases, workers are less likely 
to be motivated to improve the business success of the company through 
more adventuresome incentive practices such as open market purchases of 
company stock (line 9), stock options (line 10), an Employee Stock Purchase 116    Joseph R. Blasi, Douglas L. Kruse, and Harry M. Markowitz
Plan (line 11), a 401(k) plan company stock match (line 15), a company- wide 
proﬁ  t-  sharing plan (line 16), or even a less exposed ESOP (line 12).
Regarding individual measures of preferences for additional shared incen-
tives, as the economic insecurity score increases, workers are less willing 
to make a bet that runs the chance of losing 25 percent of ﬁ  xed pay for 
a 50/  50 chance of making 50 percent more in variable pay (line 19), wish 
their next pay increase to comprise ﬁ  xed wages rather than a mixture of 
ﬁ  xed/  performance-  based pay or all performance-  based pay (line 20), are 
unwilling to get company stock or stock options over cash incentives as part 
of their compensation (line 21), and are unwilling to accept variable pay over 
ﬁ  xed pay (line 22). As the economic insecurity score increases, the percent-
age of ﬁ  xed pay that they are willing to sacriﬁ  ce for the chance of getting a 
possible 10 percent rise in variable pay goes down (line 23). As the economic 
insecurity score increases, when asked to rank ﬁ  xed pay, cash proﬁ  t sharing, 
company stock, or stock options as the preferred compensation mechanism 
for their next pay increase, workers rank less vulnerable ﬁ  xed pay higher and 
more perilous company stock lower.
Regarding individual measures of workplace outcomes (behaviors), as the 
economic insecurity score increases, workers say they are more likely to: be 
looking for a job elsewhere in the next six months (line 30), feel less loyalty 
to the company (line 31), not see themselves working at the company for a 
long time (line 32), and not see the company as part of a longtime career 
(line 33). A higher economic insecurity score means more days absent in the 
last six months (line 35). On other outcome measures reﬂ  ecting contribut-
ing to the company, they say that they are less likely to: work harder for the 
company (line 34) or have participated in teams or meetings where they oﬀer 
suggestions to superiors on improving the company (line 38).
Two related analyses available from the authors extend these ﬁ  ndings. In 
one analysis we demonstrate that the results hold true for the typical combi-
nations of shared capitalist practices that workers actually experience in the 
economy as identiﬁ  ed by the University of Chicago’s General Social Survey. 
So, for example, these results hold true for workers holding only company 
stock, for workers holding a combination of company stock, proﬁ  t sharing, 
and broad-  based stock options, and so forth. In another analysis we focus 
only on workers who own stock in 401(k) plans by measuring the percent 
of annual pay invested in company stock. We ﬁ  nd that workers with high 
economic insecurity scores have more turnover, less loyalty, and less willing-
ness to work hard at all levels of pay invested in company stock, not just at 
low levels of pay invested in company stock. The economic insecurity status 
appears to be the key to this subjective response.2 These tables are available 
from the authors.
2. In a discussion of these ﬁ  ndings with Daniel Kahneman, he has raised the issue whether 
the (diﬀerent) ideas of an irrelevant gift (one that does not respond to an immediate need) or 
of a gift that involves costs to the recipient, have anything to do with what we found. (Personal 
communication, October 26, 2007).Risk and Lack of Diversiﬁ  cation under Employee Ownership    1 1 7
HYPOTHESIS TWO: Lack of empowerment and poor employee relations help 
explain the negative relationship between the economic insecurity score and 
attitudes toward shared capitalism, preferences for variable pay, and behavioral 
outcomes under shared rewards.
The measurement of empowerment is the Lack of Empowerment Score. 
It is an additive index of each worker’s participation in employee involve-
ment teams, satisfaction with his or her work life inﬂ  uence overall, and satis-
faction with inﬂ  uence in the job, department, and company as a whole. The 
measurement of employee relations is the Poor Employee Relations Score. 
It is an additive index of each worker’s A- F school grades of their company 
regarding its trustworthiness in keeping its promises, overall employment 
relations, fairness, and ability to create a sense of common purpose in the 
company. (Both are reverse scored so that higher scores represent lower 
empowerment and worse employee relations. See appendix, variables 21 
to 31.)
A ﬁ  rst look at this issue is provided in table 3.3 where worker reports of 
their expected turnover are compared to their scores on economic insecurity, 
empowerment, and employee relations. For ease of presentation, workers 
are divided into whether they are above or below the median on these three 
variables, and expected turnover is presented for the eight permutations. The 
highest likely turnover (23.7 percent) is among those reporting high eco-
Table 3.3  Bad versus good corporate culture in the economic insecurity score’s 
impact on workplace outcomes
   
Percent very likely to look 
hard for a job in the next 12 
months or already looking
High economic insecurity/poor empowerment/poor employee 
 relations 23.7
Low economic insecurity/poor empowerment/poor employee 
 relations 21.2
High economic insecurity/good empowerment/poor employee 
 relations 13.2
Low economic insecurity/good empowerment/poor employee 
 relations 10.8
High economic insecurity/poor empowerment/good employee 
 relations   9.8
Low economic insecurity/poor empowerment/good employee 
 relations   8.8
High economic insecurity/good empowerment/good 
  employee relations   4.5
Low economic insecurity/good empowerment/good employee 
 relations    3.9
Notes: In this table high and low economic insecurity refers, respectively, to scores above the 
median, and at or below the median. The empowerment and employee relations scores are 
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nomic insecurity, poor empowerment, and poor employee relations, while 
the lowest (3.9 percent) is among those in the opposite categories on all three 
variables. Overall, good employee relations appear most important, since 
workers report good employee relations in the four categories with the lowest 
likely turnover. In eﬀect, more vulnerable workers may respond less to this 
uncertainty in better workplaces. Other tables available from the authors 
demonstrate the same pattern for loyalty and willingness to work hard.
Turning to the regressions in table 3.4, the ﬁ  ndings also show that a good 
corporate culture—the ability to have a say at work and be treated fairly in 
employment relations—plays a critical role in the relationship between the 
economic insecurity score and the attitude and behavioral outcomes. When 
lack of empowerment and poor employee relations are added as predictors 
of the summative attitudes measure, the economic insecurity coeﬃcient goes 
down by almost 50 percent (columns [1] and [2]), and when they are added 
as predictors of the summative outcomes measure, the economic insecurity 
coeﬃcient goes down by 70 percent (columns [7] and [8]). Lack of empow-
erment is also a signiﬁ  cant predictor of the summative measure of prefer-
ences over variable pay, although the economic insecurity measure is not a 
signiﬁ  cant predictor either before or after adding lack of empowerment as 
a control.
The two key implications of these ﬁ  ndings are that: (a) a substantial por-
tion of the negative attitudes toward shared capitalism and the poor behav-
ioral outcomes among the economically insecure is not due to economic 
insecurity per se, but to corporate cultures that provide little empowerment 
and poor employee relations; and (b) the negative eﬀects of economic insecu-
rity can be counteracted by policies that increase employment and improve 
employee relations. Regarding the latter point, the magnitudes indicate that 
a one standard deviation improvement in either empowerment or employee 
relations would easily outweigh (by a multiple of two to six) a one stan-
dard deviation increase in economic insecurity in predicting the attitude and 
behavioral outcome index scores.3 These results paint a picture of potential 
worker liability in these situations that suggests that a bad and unfair cor-
porate culture is itself seen as a hazard by workers (for more on the issue of 
unfairness, see Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler [1986a, 1986b]).
HYPOTHESIS THREE: The presence or absence of high performance work 
practices helps explain the negative eﬀect of high economic insecurity scores on 
attitudes toward shared capitalism, preferences for variable pay, and behavioral 
outcomes under shared rewards.
3. In predicting the summative attitudes measure (column [2]), the eﬀect of a one standard 
deviation change in the empowerment score (employee relations score) on the ordered probit 
index would be 2.14 (2.91) times larger than the eﬀect of a one standard deviation change in 
the insecurity score. In predicting the behavioral outcomes measure (column [8]), the similar 
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The score for a high performance work system (HPWS) is based on the 
following summative index described in detail in the appendix, variables 32 
to 38. It captures elements of training intensity, company communication 
and information, employee buy- in to corporate strategy, and structuring of 
the company’s culture and work organization to support the overall com-
pany plan. A recent survey of the high performance work practices literature 
conﬁ  rms the relevance of the components used (Blasi and Kruse 2006).
The method is to examine whether the negative coeﬃcient on the economic 
insecurity score is reduced by the addition of HPWS as a control. As noted 
earlier, we contend that a more engaging work system will buﬀer worker 
response to economic insecurity. The results are in table 3.4, columns (3), 
(6), and (9). The HPWS measure is a strong and signiﬁ  cant predictor of all 
three summative measures. Controlling for HPWS, the negative coeﬃcient 
of the economic insecurity score for the attitudes measure (column [3]) is 
reduced by 50 percent relative to column (2), and the coeﬃcient is only 
one-  fourth as large as it was before controlling for lack of empowerment, 
poor employee relations, and HPWS (column [1]). It appears that workers 
have more willingness to have a proﬁ  t or stock share in their company if 
they perceive that the company invests more in their performance abilities 
through a high performance work system. Adding HPWS as a predictor of 
the summative outcomes measure (column [9]) reduces the economic inse-
curity coeﬃcient by only a small amount relative to column (8), but the fact 
that HPWS is closely related to lack of empowerment and poor employee 
relations (reducing the coeﬃcients on those variables when it is added in 
column [9]) indicates that HPWS is a key factor in reducing the economic 
insecurity eﬀect found in column (7). The results strongly suggest that highly 
economically vulnerable workers moderate their responses to this exposure 
when the work system is more progressive.
It has been demonstrated that as economic insecurity of workers rises, 
this is associated with worse worker attitudes toward shared capitalism, 
preferences for variable pay, and behavioral outcomes under shared capital-
ist arrangements. Not only do workers make some bad portfolio decisions 
under shared capitalism as the research literature reviewed in the beginning 
of this study has shown, but our results indicate that their level of economic 
insecurity also inﬂ  uences how well they actually respond to shared capital-
ist arrangements such as employee ownership in their workplace. Insecure 
workers may moderate their responses in better workplaces. One implica-
tion is that employee ownership and shared capitalist plans may need to 
be designed more carefully when they involve workers with high economic 
insecurity. Employers with shared capitalist arrangements that are struc-
tured to take into account worker responses to their economic insecurity 
and employment culture would likely, as a result, have better worker atti-
tudes, better workplace outcomes, and a greater willingness of workers to Risk and Lack of Diversiﬁ  cation under Employee Ownership    1 2 1
prefer such arrangements. This means, for example, that pushing low paid 
workers with little wealth who perceive that they are paid noncompetitive 
wages to buy company stock in 401(k) plans with their savings does not 
make economic sense for the workers, the ﬁ  rms, the shareholders, or the 
economy as a whole, because asking workers with little capital to take a 
ﬂ  yer on their personal capital is associated with a bad worker response to 
shared capitalism.
3.5      Is Shared Capitalism Consistent with Proper Diversiﬁ  cation?
Does the portfolio diversiﬁ  cation problem go away now that we know that 
workers tend to subjectively respond poorly to excessive economic insecurity 
under shared capitalist arrangements? The answer is clearly no, it does not 
go away. Our results only show that workers are subjectively sensitive to the 
economic gamble under shared capitalism, and manage to respond to it in 
their own way. However, these results do not mean that workers’ investment 
portfolios always properly diversify risk. Indeed, the irony of our results is 
that, while workers evidently respond to their subjective risk, the problem of 
objective risk in their portfolios remains. The fact that workers in the more 
progressive workplaces respond less to economic insecurity, only increases 
the importance of solving the objective exposure problem.
The concerns of economists about an objective lack of diversiﬁ  cation in 
workers’ portfolios thus needs to be considered more carefully. In the NBER 
sample the median percent of net wealth in company stock is 5 percent and 
the mean is 14 percent. While only 0.6 percent of workers have 100 percent 
of their net wealth in company stock (i.e., Muelbroek’s scenario), 4.7 per-
cent of NBER sample workers do have more than 50 percent of their net 
wealth in company stock, and 15.6 percent have more than twice the mean 
percent of net wealth in company stock; that is, have over 28 percent of their 
net wealth invested in company stock. Thus, it is likely that at least these three 
groups—in total, 20.9 percent of the workers in the NBER employee survey 
sample—may have excessive amounts of company stock in their overall 
portfolios. We can consider these groups to be approximately the workers for 
whom employee ownership plays a critical role in lack of diversiﬁ  cation.
The remainder of this section explores the question of how much invest-
ment in company stock is “too much.” The question is oft raised in discus-
sions of employee stock ownership and shared capitalism but it has never 
been empirically resolved. We provide a mathematical presentation that 
answers this critical question. Brieﬂ  y, we show that the optimal portion 
of an otherwise diversiﬁ  ed portfolio that could conceivably be in company 
stock is 8.33 percent, while 10 to 15 percent would have a small eﬀect on 
the volatility of the employee portfolio. The implications of this result are 
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3.6    Mathematical  Presentation
The theory of rational behavior under uncertainty, as developed by 
Leonard J. Savage (1954), asserts that the rational decision maker maxi-
mizes expected utility using probability beliefs where objective probabilities 
are not known. Levy and Markowitz (1979) show that, for a wide variety 
of risk-  averse utility functions and historical return distributions, mean-
  variance approximations provide almost maximum expected utility. (See 
also Markowitz [1959, chapters 6 and 13]; Dexter, Yu, and Ziemba [1980]; 
Ederington [1986]; Hlawitschka [1994]; Kroll, Levy, and Markowitz [1984]; 
Markowitz, Reid, and Tew [1994]; Pulley [1981, 1983]; and Simaan [1993].) 
Thus the justiﬁ  cation for the use of mean-  variance, according to Markow-
itz (1959) and others, is not that probability distributions are Gaussian or 
that utility is quadratic (as asserted as requirements in Tobin [1958] and 
frequently incorrectly attributed to Markowitz), but as an approximation 
to expected utility.
The mean-  variance approximation to expected utility typically takes the 
form





where E is the expected and V the variance of returns on the portfolio-  as-  a-
 whole,  and  k   0 is a risk-  aversion parameter. For example, following Kelly 
(1956) and Latané (1959), most ﬁ  nancial analysts believe that action for the 
long run involves maximizing the expected value of the log of 1.0   return. 
Levy and Markowitz show that this is closely approximated by equation (1) 
with k   1.0. In continuous time models, “Ito’s Lemma” asserts that this 
relationship is exact quite generally.
If X is the fraction of an employee’s ﬁ  nancial assets held “explicitly” in 
company stock and (1 –  X) is the fraction in all other ﬁ  nancial assets (includ-
ing, e.g., an index fund that “implicitly” owns the company stock) then
(2)  E   m1X   m2(1   X)
 V    V1X 2   V2(1   X)2   2X(1   X) 12,
where m1 and m2 are the expected (or mean) returns on the two “invest-
ments,” V1 and V2 their variances, and  12 their covariance. The latter in-
cludes the covariance between the company stock held explicitly and that 
held implicitly. Inserting equation (2) into (1) we have
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The optimum value of X is found by setting the derivative of EU to zero, 
from which emerges that X ˆ, the optimum X, satisﬁ  es
(4)  X ˆ(V1   V2   2 12)   V2    12   




The analysis simpliﬁ  es considerably if we assume that X ˆ   0, and m1   
m2, absent any stock incentive plan. The ﬁ  rst equality is plausible; since 
“other investments” may include the company’s stock, we may assume that 
it includes the ideal amount of this stock, in which case indeed X ˆ   0. Later 
we discuss the assumption that m1   m2. Given these two assumptions, equa-
tion (4) implies that
(5)   12   V2.
From this follows that equation (3) may be written as




 k{V1X 2   V2(1   X 2)}.
with m   m1   m2 and  m1   0.
We are interested here in the tradeoﬀ between increased m1 (keeping m2 
constant) and increased X, moving the investor’s allocation from the opti-
mum at X   0. As m1   m    m1 increases X ˆ, the optimum X increases as 
well. Speciﬁ  cally, diﬀerentiating equation (6) with respect to X, and setting 
dEU /   dX to zero, we ﬁ  nd
(7)  X ˆ   
 m1   
k(V1   V2)
.
The term (V1 –   V2) in the denominator of equation (7) may seem strange. 
For example, if V1   V2, the formula implies inﬁ  nite X ˆ. But equation (5) 
implies
(8)  V2    2
2
     1 1 2,
therefore
 2     1.
Thus, V2   V1 unless the two “investments” are perfectly correlated.
The assumption that m1   m2 may be plausible if (1 –   X) represents 
investment in other equities, but not if it includes substantial investment in 
money market funds or short-  term bonds. Then we would expect m2   m2. 
A standard and very convenient assumption is that X and 1 –   X represent 
investments in risky “securities” and, additionally, the investor’s risk level is 
adjusted by holding cash with interest rate r0. In this case, the Tobin Sepa-124    Joseph R. Blasi, Douglas L. Kruse, and Harry M. Markowitz
ration Theorem is applicable. If the investor can borrow as well as lend at 
the rate r0, as Sharpe (1964) assumes, then the investor will hold the risky 
portfolio that maximizes the Sharpe ratio
(9) 
E   r0  
 
,
where   is the standard deviation of portfolio return. If the investor can 
only lend, not borrow, at the rate r0, as Tobin (1958) assumes, and “cash” 
is part of the investor’s portfolio then, again, the investor holds the risky 
portfolio that maximizes the Sharpe ratio and combines it with lending (i.e., 
the holding of cash).
In general in this case, the optimum risky portfolio satisﬁ  es
(10)  CY   b ,
where C is the covariance matrix among risky securities, Y is the portfolio of 
risky securities,   is a vector of excess returns (i.e., expected returns minus the 
risk- free rate), and b is a number (as distinguished from a vector or matrix). 
In our case equation (10) specializes to
(11) 
























where we write X1 and X2 for X and 1 –   X, respectively. Solving equation 
(11) gives us
(12)  X1   
b( 1    2)
  
(1    2)V1
 X 2   
b( 2    2 1)
  
 2(1    2)V1
.
If b    2V1/   2   V2/   2 then X1   X2   1. A smaller b implies that “cash” 
equal 1 –   X1 –   X2 is held.
A plausible example might have  2   0.2,  1   0.4. (The former is approxi-
mately the standard deviation of the S&P 500 Index; the latter then would 
follow from a one-  factor model
r1        r   u
with r1 representing the return on company stock; r that on an underlying 
factor with the same variance as the S&P 500;     1 and the variance of 
the idiosyncratic term u equal three times that to the variance of r.) Then 
equation (8) implies     1/  2.
Solving for X   X1 in equation (12) with these parameters yields
(13) 3X   
 1    2  
 2
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For example, if (1 –   X) supplied 4 percentage points of excess return and X 
supplied 5, then
X ˆ   0.0833.
A higher X, in the neighborhood of 10 or even 15 percent, would not be 
imprudent. Because the relationship between V and X is quadratic, small 
deviations from zero, the optimum if m1   m2, do not increase V or reduce 
EU much, even if m1   m2. Speciﬁ  cally, equation (6) implies






   2(V1   V2)X.
Thus, at X   0, dV/  dX   0. A small increase in X has virtually no eﬀect 
on V.
Table 3.5 shows the values of portfolio V and   for various values of X 
for the parameters of our example. Figure 3.1 plots the relationship between 
  and X. These reinforce the observation that X around 10 or 15 percent 
has small eﬀect of the volatility of the employee’s portfolio. For example, 
a 10 percent investment in company stock has a standard deviation of 20.3 
Table 3.5  Values of V and  for various values of X
  X   1 – X   V      
0.00 1.00 0.0400 0.200
0.05 0.95 0.0403 0.201
0.10 0.90 0.0412 0.203
0.15 0.85 0.0427 0.207
0.20 0.80 0.0448 0.212
0.25 0.75 0.0475 0.218
0.30 0.70 0.0508 0.225
0.35 0.65 0.0547 0.234
0.40 0.60 0.0592 0.243
0.45 0.55 0.0643 0.254
0.50 0.50 0.0700 0.265
0.55 0.45 0.0763 0.276
0.60 0.40 0.0832 0.288
0.65 0.35 0.0907 0.301
0.70 0.30 0.0988 0.314
0.75 0.25 0.1075 0.328
0.80 0.20 0.1168 0.342
0.85 0.15 0.1267 0.356
0.90 0.10 0.1372 0.370
0.95 0.05 0.1483 0.385
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percent, whereas a 15 percent investment in company stock has a standard 
deviation of return of 20.7 percent, up slightly from 20.0 percent for no 
company stock as compared to 40.0 percent for all company stock.
The diﬀerence between the 8 1/ 3 percent, which is optimal in this example, 
and the 10 or 15 percent that is not too imprudent, suggests a possible “free-
  rider” problem. From the individual employee’s point of view, ideally he or 
she would like everyone else to have 10 or 15 percent invested and have 8 1/ 3 
invested himself or herself.
Variables V,  , and EU are continuous functions of the input parameters; 
thus small changes in the assumptions of this example cause small changes 
in the table and the ﬁ  gure. Thus it seems likely that any reasonable estimates 
will leave our general conclusion intact. A small but meaningful employee 
stock ownership level will not signiﬁ  cantly deteriorate the diversiﬁ  cation of 
employee portfolios.
3.7    Conclusion
These exploratory insights on the role of risk in properly structuring 
shared capitalist arrangements have been developed by studying how work-
ers themselves would confront and resolve the issue of such hazard and fur-
ther examining the implications of portfolio theory. The main revision to the 
previous empirical research on the economics of employee ownership is that 
a high level of vulnerability is not a requirement of making shared capitalism 
work best. The results show clearly that excessive worker exposure based on 
a worker’s level of economic insecurity has the capability of reversing every 
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single positive individual and workplace outcome documented in decades 
of research on shared capitalism and the other studies in this volume. Lack 
of empowerment and poor employee relations play key roles in driving the 
negative impact of this jeopardy. Ironically, workers in corporations with 
the most progressive work practices may not pay as much attention to their 
potential liability as their objective economic situation requires.
This ﬁ  nding may partly explain why empirical results on the impact of 
employee ownership on ﬁ  rm performance are not always uniformly positive 
and sometimes show dispersion, why some of the most progressive corpo-
rations ignore these issues, and why some very large and very speculative 
employee ownership experiments have failed miserably. The most notable 
failure is the United Airlines employee buyout where endangering the capi-
tal of individual workers, wage substitution, lack of empowerment, and 
poor employee relations all played a large role consistent with our analysis. 
Indeed, the implementation and to some extent the design of the United 
Airlines employee ownership plan appears to have violated every ﬁ  nding of 
this study. Moreover, many United workers may have also had undiversiﬁ  ed 
portfolios. Worker economic insecurity has been an unmeasured variable in 
past research. Two clear implications are that: (a) the structure of employee 
ownership and proﬁ  t- sharing plans needs to be “ﬁ  t” to the economic insecu-
rity or economic security proﬁ  le of the workers; and (b) portfolio diversiﬁ  ca-
tion can be generally consistent with shared capitalism.
Eliminating shared capitalism from capitalist societies is not the answer 
to the problem of objective economic hazard. Remember that Adam Smith 
emphasizes the incentive eﬀect of capitalism and its superiority to feudal 
systems and expected shared capitalism to be a positive motivator. Portfolio 
theory suggests how a wide range of workers could have employee owner-
ship and diversiﬁ  cation at the same time. Portfolio theory’s implications for 
this discussion is sometimes reduced in the popular mind to the quick sum-
mary “buy an index of the entire market” but, as we have seen, this is not 
precisely what portfolio theory says. Portfolio theory does not propose that 
all risk be banned so that every global citizen should own a completely diver-
siﬁ  ed basket of securitized assets worldwide. In such a world there would be 
no home ownership, no individual asset ownership, no sole proprietorships, 
no small businesspeople, no entrepreneurs, no high tech start- ups, no owners 
who are “principals” in corporations, no room for workers to have shares 
in their company; indeed, no shared capitalism. There would, in short, be 
no capitalism in the individual incentive sense. Nevertheless, as noted in 
chapter 11, looking at the economy as a whole workers who own company 
stock report it represents 20 percent of personal wealth in the General Social 
Survey. This suggests that there are extremes of employee stock holding in 
the economy but it is most likely concentrated in a minority of employees, 
as the NBER data suggest.
One limitation of this analysis is that it does not address the additional 128    Joseph R. Blasi, Douglas L. Kruse, and Harry M. Markowitz
chance of losing one’s job or ﬁ  rm-  speciﬁ  c capital at the same time that 
one can potentially lose one’s investment in the stock of the company. 
If the company closes, both the job and an undiversiﬁ  ed portfolio are in 
danger. Our approach has been to address the exposure in the investment 
portfolio.
Research on employee ownership and shared capitalism often ignores or 
minimizes both subjective and objective risk. This disregard has taken place 
for decades despite the fact that excessive lack of diversiﬁ  cation has been the 
principal objection by some economists, other social scientists, and policy-
makers to the idea of broadened shared incentives and employee ownership. 
The goal of this chapter has been to confront these objections head-  on 
and attempt through ﬁ  ne-  tuned empirical analysis and careful mathemati-
cal explication to understand them better. As national wage systems evolve 
in the twenty- ﬁ  rst century and inﬂ  ation- adjusted wage increases ﬂ  atten, the 
additional income workers can get from capital income (shares of proﬁ  ts 
and stock and capital appreciation in their ﬁ  rms), may constitute a poten-
tial future component of worker wealth. Risk is not the enemy of shared 
capitalism, but the elements of it must be directly confronted, empirically 
understood, and theoretically considered in a sound manner.
Appendix
Variable Deﬁ  nitions and Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variables
Risk Aversion and Risk Seeking
1.  Attitude toward risk: “Some people like to take risks and others dislike 
taking risks. Where would you place yourself on a scale of how much you 
like or dislike taking risks, where 0 is hating to take any kind of risk and 10 
is loving to take risks?” (0– 10 scale, 0   Hate to take risks, 10   Love to take 
risks). Mean   5.61, s.d.   2.38, n   34,794.
2.  Highest price paid for a bet: “You are oﬀered a bet. You have a 10 per-
cent chance of winning $1,000. Would you take the bet if it cost you: (mark 
highest price you would pay: $0, $1, $10, $20, $50, $100, $150)?” Mean   
$23.37, s.d.   32.40, n   34,751.
Outcomes
3.  Planning to stay with employer versus looking to turnover: “How likely 
is it that you will decide to look hard for a job with another organization 
within the next twelve months?” (0–  3 scale, 0   Already looking; 1   Very Risk and Lack of Diversiﬁ  cation under Employee Ownership    1 2 9
likely; 2   Somewhat likely; 2   Not at all likely). Mean   2.45, s.d.   .81, 
n   35,080.
4.  Extent of loyalty to current employer: “How much loyalty would you 
say you feel toward the company you work for as a whole?” (0–  3 scale, 
0   No loyalty at all; 1   Only a little; 2   Some; 3   A lot). Mean   2.37, 
s.d.   .78, n   34,555.
5.  Willingness to work harder to help company succeed: “To what extent 
do you agree or disagree with this statement? “I am willing to work harder 
than I have to in order to help the company I work for succeed.” (0–  4 scale, 
0   Strongly disagree; 1   Disagree; 2   Neither agree nor disagree; 3   
Agree; 4   Strongly agree). Mean   3.04, s.d.   0.89; n   35,091.
6. Whether worker expects to stay with employer for the foreseeable 
future: “Which ONE of the following statements best describes how you 
think of your current employer? 1   I see myself working here for the fore-
seeable future (a long time). 0   I do not see myself working here very long.” 
(0–  1 scale). Mean   0.83; s.d.   0.37; n   34,794.
7.  Whether worker sees current job as part of long-  term career: “Think-
ing about your current job (rather than your employer), do you look upon 
it as part of your long-  term career, or a position that is not part of your 
long-  term career? 1   Part of my long-  term career; 0   A position that 
is not part of my long term career.” (0–  1 scale). Mean   0.78, s.d.   0.42, 
n   34,991.
8.  Summative outcomes variable: Additive index of variables 3–  7 above. 
(0–  12 scale). Mean   9.49, s.d.   2.26, n   33,467.
Attitudes
9.  Importance of employee ownership: “How important is it to you to 
work in a company that provides stock ownership to its employees? Please 
rate on a scale of 0 to 10.” (0–  10 scale, 0   Not important, 10   Highly 
important). Mean   7.44, s.d.   2.68, n   34,729.
10.  Feeling like an owner of the company: “How much do you feel like 
an owner of this company?” (1–  10 scale, 1   Not important—A moderate 
degree—10   Very much). Mean   4.81, s.d.   3.02, n   34,910.
11.  Summative attitudes variable: Additive index of variables 9– 10 above. 
(0–  20 scale). Mean   12.24, s.d.   4.93, n   34,525.
Preferences
12.  Preference regarding a small variable pay risk: “We would like to ask 
about your attitude toward variable pay in two imaginary jobs. Job A and 
Job B are identical except for the fact that Job A pays a ﬁ  xed amount and 
Job B pays an amount that varies. Based on the following information, which 
one would you choose? Job A, which guarantees an amount equal to your 
current pay, or Job B, which each year has a 50/  50 chance that you would 
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would make 5 percent LESS than your current pay?” (Scale: 0   Job A, 1   
Job B). Mean   0.40 s.d.   0.49, n   28,700.
13.  Preference regarding variable or ﬁ  xed pay for next pay increase: “For 
your next pay increase, would you prefer that it come in the form of: 1.) All 
ﬁ  xed wages, with no proﬁ  t sharing or company stock. 2.) Split between ﬁ  xed 
wages and proﬁ  t sharing or company stock. 3.) All in the form of proﬁ  t 
sharing or company stock.” (1–  3 scale, textual responses as shown.) Mean 
  1.84, s.d.   .60, n   22,623.
14. Summative preferences variable: Additive index of variables 12–  13 
above. (0–  4 scale) Mean   2.22, s.d.   0.81, n   21,040.
15. Incentive threshold point: “Some people think that basing pay on 
company performance will encourage employees to take an active role in 
promoting the company’s success. At your company, how much of their 
pay would most employees have to get in performance-  based pay to moti-
vate them to take more responsibility for the success of the company? 
_5%, _10%, _20%, _30%, _40%, _50%, _60%, _70%, _80%, _90%, _100%, 
_Performance-  based pay would not make a diﬀerence.” (0–  100 percent 
scale). Mean   31.7, s.d.   24.6, n   25,435.
16.  Percent of worker’s wealth in equities overall: “About what percent 
of your total wealth is in stocks overall? ________% (1–  100 percent scale). 
Mean   29.2, s.d.   26.6; n   25,715.
Independent Variables
17.  Economic insecurity score. Measure of the economic status quo of 
each worker denoting increasing economic insecurity. Summative measure 
of questions 18–  20 below including:
    Quartiles representing highest to lowest annual ﬁ  xed pay plus overtime 
(Score: 0–  3)
   Quartiles representing highest to lowest total wealth divided by ﬁ  xed pay 
(Score: 0–  3)
    Five categories representing highest to lowest competitiveness of ﬁ  xed 
pay (Score: 0–  4)
Mean   5.28, s.d.   2.12; n   22,980. Minimum 0; Maximum 10.
18. Annual ﬁ  xed pay plus overtime: “What was your annual base pay 
last year (excluding any overtime, bonuses, and commissions) BEFORE 
taxes and deductions? If you receive overtime pay, how much did you earn 
in overtime last year?” Mean   60,035, s.d.   42,092, n   28,365.
   For  ﬁ  rst component of the economic insecurity score, answers were re-
coded by quartile: 0:  $80,000; 1:  $50,000 and  $80,000; 2:  $33,000 
and  $50,000; 3:  $33,000.
19. Total wealth (minus debts) with spouse/  partner: “People have var-Risk and Lack of Diversiﬁ  cation under Employee Ownership    1 3 1
ious assets that constitute their wealth. These include the value of their 
house minus the mortgage, plus their vehicles, stocks and mutual funds, 
cash, checking accounts, retirement accounts including 401(k) and pension 
assets, and so forth. Taking account of all of these things would you say that 
the WEALTH of you and your spouse/  partner is: Less than $5,000; $5,000 
to $20,000; $20,000 to $40,000; $40,000 to $75,000; $75,000 to $100,000; 
$100,000 to $150,000; $150,000 to $250,000; $250,000 to $500,000; $500,000 
to $1 million; Over $1 million.” For analytical purposes, each worker was 
assigned the midpoint of each category as their assumed wealth. Mean   
312,020, s.d.   613,975, n   28,920.
    For second component of the economic insecurity score, answers were 
divided by ﬁ  xed pay plus overtime, and recoded into quartiles: 0:  6.37; 
1:  3.09 and  6.37; 2:  1.28 and  3.09 3:  1.28.
20. Competitiveness of annual ﬁ  xed pay: “Do you believe your ﬁ  xed 
annual wages last year were higher or lower than those of employees with 
similar experience and job descriptions in other companies in your region? 
Please circle a number from 1 to 5.” Mean   2.67, s.d.   1.00, n   31.091.
   For third component of the economic insecurity score, answers were sub-
tracted from 5 for a range of 0 to 4.
Other Variables
21. Lack of empowerment score: Summative measure of 22–  26 below 
(reverse scored from format used in survey):
  Overall satisfaction with job-  related inﬂ  uence (Score: 0–  3)
 Worker  inﬂ  uence at the job level (Score: 0–  3)
 Worker  inﬂ  uence at the work group or department level (Score: 0–  3)
 Worker  inﬂ  uence at the company level (Score: 0–  3)
  Worker involvement in a team, committee, or task force (Score: 0–  1)
Mean   6.07, s.d.   2.66, n   33,855; Minimum 0; Maximum 13.
22.  Overall satisfaction with job- related inﬂ  uence. “Overall, how satisﬁ  ed 
are you with the inﬂ  uence you have in company decisions that aﬀect your 
job and work life?” (Scale: 0–  3, 0   very satisﬁ  ed, 1   somewhat satisﬁ  ed, 
2   not too satisﬁ  ed, 3   not at all satisﬁ  ed). Mean   1.36; s.d.   0.84, 
n   34,981.
23. Worker  inﬂ  uence at the job level. “How much involvement and direct 
inﬂ  uence do YOU have in: A. Deciding how to do your job and organize the 
work.” (Scale: 0– 3, 0   A lot, 1   Some, 2   Only a little, 3   None). Mean 
  0.69, s.d.   0.86, n   35,109.
24. Worker  inﬂ  uence at the work group or department level. “How much 
involvement and direct inﬂ  uence do YOU have in: B. Setting goals for your 132    Joseph R. Blasi, Douglas L. Kruse, and Harry M. Markowitz
work group or department.” (Scale: 0–  3, 0   A lot, 1   Some, 2   Only a 
little, 3   None). Mean   1.38, s.d.   1.03, n   35,015.
25. Worker  inﬂ  uence at the company level. “How much involvement and 
direct inﬂ  uence do YOU have in: C. Overall company decisions.” (Scale: 
0– 3,  0    A lot, 1   Some, 2   Only a little, 3   None). Mean   2.28, 
s.d.   0.86, n   34,978.
26. Worker involvement in a team, committee, or task force: “Some 
companies have organized workplace decision-  making in ways to get more 
employee input and involvement. Are you personally involved in any team, 
committee, or task force that addresses issues such as product quality, cost 
cutting, productivity, health and safety, or other workplace issues?” (Scale: 
0   yes; 1   no). Mean   0.37, s.d.   0.48, n   34,722.
27.  Poor employee relations score: Summative measure of 28–  31 below 
(reverse scored from format used in survey):
  Company grade for trustworthiness in keeping its promises (Score: 0–  4)
  Company grade for overall employment relations (Score: 0–  4)
  Company grade for fairness (Score: 0–  6)
   Company grade for creating a sense of common purpose in the company 
(Score: 0–  4)
Mean   6.75, s.d.   4.14, n   34,199; Minimum 0; Maximum 18.
28.  Worker’s grade of company for trustworthiness: “If you were to rate 
how well this company takes care of workers on a scale similar to school 
grades, what grade would you give in these areas? (C is an average grade.) 
Trustworthiness in keeping its promises.” (Scale: A   0; B   1; C   2; 
D   3; F   4). Mean   1.62, s.d.   1.14, n   34,850.
29.  Worker’s grade of company for fairness: “Overall, this company is fair 
to its employees.” (Scale: Strongly agree   0, Strongly disagree   6). Mean 
  2.14, s.d.   1.67, n   35,031.
30.  Worker’s grade of company for overall employment relations: “If you 
were to rate how well this company takes care of workers on a scale similar 
to school grades, what grade would you give in these areas? (C is an average 
grade.) Overall relations with employees.” (Scale: A   0; B   1; C   2; 
D   3; F   4). Mean   1.51, s.d.   1.05, n   34,928.
31.  Worker’s grade of company for creating a sense of common purpose: 
“If you were to rate how well this company takes care of workers on a scale 
similar to school grades, what grade would you give in these areas? (C is 
an average grade.) Creating a sense of common purpose in the company.” 
(Scale: A   0; B   1; C   2; D   3; F   4). Mean   1.50, s.d.   1.04, 
n   34,916.
32. High performance work system: Summative measure of 33–  38 
below:
    Whether workers have received formal training from their employer in 
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    The number of hours of this training measured by four increasing cate-
gories of investment by the ﬁ  rm.
    Whether workers say they understand their company’s overall plan for 
being successful.
    Whether workers say that they agree with this plan.
    Whether workers say that the company is providing them with the infor-
mation, training, and resources necessary to help achieve the goals of 
this plan.
   Whether workers feel that the company’s culture encourages you to share 
your ideas about how to achieve the goals of this plan.
Mean   13.35, s.d.   3.31, n   23,714.
33. Whether worker received formal training by employer. “In the last 
twelve months have you received any formal training from your current 
employer, such as in classes or seminars sponsored by the employer?” (Score: 
0   No; 1   Yes). Mean   0.59, s.d.   0.49, n   34,913.
34.  Hours of formal training in last twelve months: “About how many 
hours of formal training have you received in the last twelve months?” (Scale: 
actual number of hours). Mean   18.88, s.d.   41.57, n   34,154.
  Recoding for training hours variable into four ascending categories:
      Percent of sample with this score 
0: 0 hours 41.0
1:  0 and  11 hours 17.6
2:  11 and  33 hours 18.5
  3:  33 and  1,680 hours  22.8  
35.  Whether worker says he/ she understands company’s overall plan: “To 
what extent do you: Understand your company’s overall plan for being suc-
cessful?” (Scale: 1–  4, 1   not at all, 2   very little, 3   to some extent, 4   
to a great extent). Mean   3.18, s.d.   0.72, n   25,046.
36.  Whether worker says she/  he agrees with company’s overall plan: “To 
what extent do you: Personally agree with this plan?” (Scale: 1– 4, 1   not at 
all, 2   very little, 3   to some extent, 4   to a great extent). Mean   3.02, 
s.d.   –  .73, n   24,515.
37. Whether worker says he/  she has info, training, and resources to 
achieve the company’s overall plan. “To what extent do you: Feel that the 
company is providing you with the information, training, and resources 
necessary to help achieve the goals of this plan?” (Scale: 1–  4, 1   not at all, 
2   very little, 3   to some extent, 4   to a great extent). Mean   2.84, s.d. 
  0.83, n   24,906.
38.  Whether worker feels company culture encourages sharing of ideas 
about achieving plan’s goals. “To what extent do you: Feel that your com-134    Joseph R. Blasi, Douglas L. Kruse, and Harry M. Markowitz
pany’s culture encourages you to share your ideas about how to achieve the 
goals of this plan?” (Scale: 1–  4, 1   not at all, 2   very little, 3   to some 
extent, 4   to a great extent). Mean   2.74, s.d.   0.91, n   24,841.
39. Percent of wealth in company stock: “About what percent of your 
wealth is in your employer’s stock?” (Scale: 0–  100 percent). Mean   16.9, 
s.d.   21.2, n   26,818.
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